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PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP AS SOCIAL CREATIVITY
NANCY C. ROBERTS
Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, USA
The article begins with an overview of the innovation process and the en-
trepreneurial process, each treated as separate but interrelated phenomena. The
innovation process tracks the evolution of a new idea through time, whereas the
entrepreneurial process tracks the activities that entrepreneurs develop to pro-
mote and defend the idea against its detractors. The model of innovation and
entrepreneurship introduced distinguishes between individual and collective en-
trepreneurship and identifies two types of collective entrepreneurship: team en-
trepreneurship and functional entrepreneurship. A Minnesota case study demon-
strates the power of both team and functional entrepreneurship. It also illustrates
how important the linkages are between the entrepreneurs and their larger com-
munity. An innovative idea’s development and survival depends on an “ecology
of organizations” that provide “venture” capital for analysis and experimenta-
tion. The vast networks of contacts and associations represent a form of social
capital just as important as the community’s economic capital. In this case, both
aspects of social creativity—the community resources and the network of social
relations—were found to be instrumental in passing and implementing the first
public school choice program in the country.
KEYWORDS: Collective entrepreneurship, entrepreneurs, innovators, public entrepreneur-
ship, public innovation, team entrepreneurship.
Public entrepreneurship is defined as the development of a new idea and the nurtur-
ing of the idea throughout all phases of the innovation process—policy initiation,
design, and implementation (Roberts and King, 1996). Occurring in the complex,
shared power world of public bureaus, legislative arenas, and judicial fora, pub-
lic entrepreneurship usually calls on the collective efforts of a large number of
people. Bureaucratic entrepreneurship, for example, often links individuals who
invent the new ideas with other members of the organization who champion and
resource them during the later phases of policy implementation and evaluation.
Legislative entrepreneurship pools the talents of policy intellectuals, who give life
to new ideas, with support from elected officials and astute administrators, who
defend the ideas against competing policy alternatives. Judicial entrepreneurship
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draws on the shared enterprise between appellate judges and litigants, who, through
their collective efforts, craft new judicial interpretations and establish precedent-
settings cases (Roberts, 1999).
Despite the collective character of public entrepreneurship, most of the research
extols the virtues of individual entrepreneurs (Harris and Kinney, 2003; Mintrom,
1995; Schneider et al., 1995). We read of the larger-than-life exploits of public
entrepreneurs who, despite all odds, take an innovative idea and move it into prac-
tice (Doig and Hargrove, 1987; Lewis, 1980). They are tenacious, highly creative,
self-confident, hardworking, charismatic, decisive, energetic, persistent, and un-
conventional. They have a “capacity to engage in systematic rational analysis, an
ability to see new possibilities offered by the evolving historical situation, and a
desire to ‘make a difference’—to throw . . . energies and personal reputation into
the fray in order to bring about changes” (Doig and Hargrove, 1987, p. 11). No-
table is their willingness to take considerable risks to push new ideas (Ramamurti,
1986; Kingdon, 1984).
Giving them their due, these individuals are remarkable for their vision, tenacity,
and ability to make things happen. But the single-minded focus on the individual
entrepreneur obscures the vast range of entrepreneurial behavior that is collec-
tive in nature and depends on a rich, supportive context in order to sustain the
innovation process. Although we occasionally find references that underscore the
importance of the collective effort and the entrepreneurial context in the public
sector (Bardach, 1977; Eyestone, 1977; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993), col-
lective entrepreneurship has yet to receive the same level of attention and focus
as individual entrepreneurship. As a form of social creativity and an example of
the contextual approach to understanding invention (Montuori and Purser, 1995),
it has been least explored and understood. Consequently, the goal of this article
is to explore the parameters of collective entrepreneurship and to illustrate how
entrepreneurial creativity draws on the social context to fuel the innovation process.
The article begins with an overview of the innovation process and the en-
trepreneurial process, each treated as separate but interrelated phenomena. The
innovation process tracks the evolution of a new idea through time, whereas the
entrepreneurial process tracks the activities that entrepreneurs develop to pro-
mote and defend the idea against its detractors. The model of innovation and
entrepreneurship that emerges enables us to distinguish between individual and
collective entrepreneurship and identify two types of collective entrepreneurship:
team entrepreneurship and functional entrepreneurship. A Minnesota case study
demonstrates the power of both team and functional entrepreneurship. It also illus-
trates how important the linkages are between the entrepreneurs and their larger
community. In this instance, a resource-munificent community provided a very
rich base on which public entrepreneurs could draw. The idea’s development and
survival depended on an “ecology of organizations” that provided “venture” cap-
ital for analysis and experimentation. In addition, the case underscores the deft
management of social relations both within the entrepreneurial team and between
the team and its supporters. The vast networks of contacts and associations that
the public entrepreneurs developed represented a form of social capital just as
important as the community’s economic capital. In this case, both aspects of social
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creativity—the community resources and the network of social relations—were
found to be instrumental in passing and implementing the first public school choice
program in the country.
COLLECTIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP
An understanding of collective entrepreneurship starts with a description of the
innovation process. Innovation is the translation of a new idea from its initial
state to its actualization in practice as a full-blown innovation. The innovation
process begins with a new idea. The idea can be a new technology, a new service,
a new product, or even a new administrative procedure (Daft and Becker, 1978).
Classification of an idea as “new” depends on its context. An idea is considered
to be new if it is perceived to be new by the relevant unit of adoption (Zaltman,
et al., 1973, p. 10). Sometimes new ideas originate in a particular setting. In other
instances, a new idea is adapted or even borrowed from another setting and then
applied in the entrepreneur’s own context (Peltz and Munson, 1982).
The development of the new idea and the association of the idea with some need,
problem, or concern, marks the first phase of the innovation process, often referred
to as initiation or creation (Polsby, 1984; Roberts and King, 1996). Initiation is
followed by the design phase that translates the idea into a more concrete and
tangible form (such as a position paper, a prototype, or model). Completion of
the design phase requires the approval of powerholders and gatekeepers whose
resources and support are necessary to proclaim the new idea as law, statute, or
policy. Implementation follows the design phase when the new idea is tested in
practice to ascertain how well it functions. New ideas that survive implementation
are described as innovations; ideas that do not survive are considered to be failed
ideas (Roberts and King, 1996). Institutionalization is the final phase when the
new idea becomes accepted practice. Thus, we can think of the innovation process
consisting of a series of hurdles or transformations that move the new idea from
an initial state to its final state. The horizontal dimension in Figure 1 represents
the process graphically.1
The vertical dimension in Figure 1 represents the entrepreneurial process. En-
trepreneurs are the drivers and protectors of the innovative idea as it moves through
time. They design and develop a set of activities in order to push the innovative
idea forward. The range of their activities can be extensive depending on how
well known the idea is, how much resistance there is to the idea, and the level of
support the idea attracts. One way to think of the vertical dimension is to view it
as representing the activity structure of the entrepreneurs. Table 1 illustrates the
activity structure of a group of public entrepreneurs (as described in the case that
follows) who were advocating radical policy change in the public schools. The
activities can be subdivided into four basic categories: creative/intellectual activ-
ities, strategic activities, mobilization and execution activities, and administrative
and evaluative activities. Each set of activities was developed collectively among
the public entrepreneurs and used throughout the innovation process. Taken as a
whole, they created a network of supportive relationships that protect the new idea,
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Table 1
Activity Structure of Public Entrepreneurs
Creative/Intellectual Activities
1. Generate Ideas
*Invent new policy ideas
*Apply models and ideas from other policy domains
2. Define Problem and Section Solution
*Define performance gap
*Identify preferred solution alternative
3. Disseminate Ideas
Strategic Activities
1. Formulate grand strategy and vision
2. Evolve political strategy
3. Develop heuristics for action
Mobilization and Execution Activities
1. Establish demonstration projects
2. Cultivate bureaucratic insiders
3. Collaborate with high-profile individuals/elite groups
4. Enlist elected officials
5. Form lobby groups and coordinate efforts
6. Cultivate media attention and support
Administrative and Evaluative Activities
1. Facilitate program administration
2. Participate in program evaluation
Figure 1. Conceptual map of the change process.
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Figure 2. Innovative ideas with different levels of resistance.
defend it against its detractors, and nurture it through the vagaries of the innovation
process.2
Roberts and King speculated that this field changes size depending on the level
of resistance to the new idea (1996). As seen in Figure 2, a new idea that provokes
little resistance, as represented by the “arrows of attack, ” does not require a large
amount entrepreneurial energy to sustain the idea on its innovation journey. People
may be favorably disposed toward the idea or at least not willing to work toward
its demise. There is less need for a large network of contacts, supporters, and
resources because it takes little to convince people of the idea’s merits. On the
other hand, as shown in the second diagram in Figure 2, if the new idea activates
opposition as represented by the numerous arrows of attack, then a greater level
of entrepreneurial energy would have to be generated to protect it. That is to
say, we would expect a more complex relational pattern and network structure
of entrepreneurial activity to sponsor the idea and to overcome the resistance to
it. Viewed from this “energy perspective,” entrepreneurs are considered catalysts
who create an energy field of relations to envelope and protect the innovative idea.
The size of the relational field is expected to vary based on the level of challenge
the idea provokes and the amount of entrepreneurial energy that is required to
overcome it.
Taken together, the innovative idea vector and the entrepreneurial vector are
interrelated. They work in tandem to produce innovation. The innovation vector
tracks the various manifestations of the new idea (idea, prototype, innovation) as
it moves through initiation, design, implementation, and institutionalization in the
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policy process. The unit of analysis of the innovation process is the new idea.
The entrepreneurial vector tracks the agents of change who galvanize support for
and counter resistance to the innovative idea as it moves through time. The unit
of analysis for the entrepreneurial process is the entrepreneur and the relational
network of activities he or she develops in support of the innovative idea (Roberts
and King, 1996).
This model provides several conceptual advantages. First, it enables us to distin-
guish between entrepreneurship and innovation. Although related, entrepreneur-
ship and innovation are two different processes. Entrepreneurs are the necessary
but not sufficient element for innovation to occur. Their creativity and initiative
spark the development of new ideas. They are the catalysts that propel the innova-
tive idea forward through the innovation process. At the same time, entrepreneurs
fail or succeed to the extent their ideas attract support and resources from others.
At some point, the innovative idea takes on a life of its own and has to be treated
as separate from the entrepreneur who may have given it life. In fact, the ideal
situation is when others begin to call the innovative idea their own. Thus, the en-
trepreneur and the innovative idea should be treated as two conceptually distinct
entities.
The model also enables us to make finer-grained distinctions between individual
and collective forms of entrepreneurship. Individual entrepreneurship relies on the
exploits of a single individual who works through all phases of the innovation
process. Acting independently, she generates a new idea, creates its design, and
oversees its translation and implementation into practice. In contrast, collective
entrepreneurship draws on multiple people to husband and shape an idea through
initiation, design, and implementation into a full-blown innovation.
Probing collective entrepreneurship more deeply, we find its expression can take
one of two forms: team entrepreneurship or functional entrepreneurship (Roberts,
1992; Roberts and King, 1996). As illustrated in the top diagram in Figure 3,
team entrepreneurship occurs when multiple entrepreneurs join forces and work
together to push an idea through all phases of the innovation process. Although
each person is an entrepreneur in his own right, all decide it is more advantageous
to pool their resources and act in concert with other entrepreneurs. The following
case documents the work of six public entrepreneurs who cooperated through all
innovation phases—creation, design, and implementation—and thus offers a good
example of team entrepreneurship (Roberts, 1992; Roberts and King, 1996).
Functional entrepreneurship, on the other hand, as shown in the bottom dia-
gram in Figure 3, occurs without the presence of a single entrepreneur. It occurs
when experts from different functional areas of expertise coordinate their efforts
and resources in order to push a new idea into practice (Roberts, 1992; Roberts
and King, 1996). For example, policy intellectuals generate a new policy idea and
defend it against alternative definitions and solutions to social problems. Policy
intellectuals often work with policy advocates who extol the virtues of the idea be-
cause they believe it will solve some problem or meet some need. Policy advocates,
in turn, serve as a bridge between policy intellectuals and policy champions—those
who hold elected office. Capitalizing on their prestige, visibility, and resources,
policy champions then introduce the idea to the public and work the seams of
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Figure 3. Collective entrepreneurship.
government to secure its expression in law, statute, or policy. Once the new idea
is established in law, statute, or policy, policy administrators then recommend
ways to implement it and increase its acceptance into the field. Finally, policy
evaluators can suggest appropriate means to ensure the idea receives a fair review
based on its merits. In the case that follows, we also see evidence of functional
entrepreneurship when functional specialists (policy advocates, policy champions,
policy administrators, and policy evaluators) joined forces with the team of policy
entrepreneurs to coordinate efforts and move the new idea from one phase of the
policy process to another. Thus, in this case example, we also find evidence of
functional entrepreneurship.3
CASE OF COLLECTIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP—MINNESOTA
PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE
A new idea surfaced in Minnesota known as public school choice or open enroll-
ment. Its development can be traced to the late 1970s and early 1980s as a group
of individuals (later to be identified as six public entrepreneurs) began meeting
informally with educators and other change agents to discuss their concerns about
the declining quality of Minnesota and U.S. education. The aim of the idea was to
give parents the opportunity to send their children to school districts better suited
to their children’s needs. Rather than choosing districts based on a real estate de-
cision, parents would be allowed, indeed encouraged, to choose a district based on
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student requirements and the learning needs of each child. The idea was eventually
known as “public school choice.”
The idea of public school choice was honed and shaped over a number of years.
The rationales to support it attracted a diverse audience of parents, educators,
politicians, business people, policy intellectuals, and advocacy groups. As the idea
circulated in the policy community, its proponents grew in number. Eventually
the public entrepreneurs were successful in catching the attention of Governor
Perpich who became the idea’s ardent champion. Joining forces with the public
entrepreneurs, the governor introduced the new idea to a skeptical public and
legislature in January 1985. The bill, entitled Access to Excellence, launched the
critical design phase of the innovation process.
Rancorous debates in the press and the legislature followed the idea’s introduc-
tion. Traditional educational groups opposed the legislation and fought vigorously
against it. Thanks to vocal and energetic public entrepreneurs and supporters, the
new idea did manage to gain a following. By June of 1985, one aspect of the gov-
ernor’s original bill managed to survive a joint legislative conference committee.
Signed into law as the Postsecondary Enrollment Options Act (1985), it allowed
high school juniors and seniors to attend Minnesota colleges of their choice, re-
ceiving both high school and college credit at state expense.
The Commissioner of Education, Ruth Randall, immediately introduced the
new idea (as law) to the state school districts. The public entrepreneurs assisted
her in the implementation process by providing support for mass mailings and
district follow-ups. Thus began the implementation phase of the innovation pro-
cess. Concerned that the new law be given a fair hearing and test, implementers
also sponsored an evaluation study to track the outcomes of the new law, calling
on students to describe their experiences and testify before the legislature. When
reports were laudatory, efforts to gut the law were checked, at least in the short
run.
The success of postsecondary enrollment for juniors and seniors, a subset of
the governor’s controversial bill, fueled interest in expanding the law throughout
the K–12 educational system. Over the next three years, variants of the idea of
public school choice cycled and recycled through their own initiation, design, and
implementation phases. Thanks to waves of successful legislation (the Voluntary
K–12 Enrollment Options Act, the High School Graduation Incentives Act, the
Area Learning Centers and Alternative Programs Act), the new idea attracted
more and more district support and student participation. Eventually, the governor
signed the K–12 Mandatory Enrollment Options Act (1988) that required every
school district to release students to attend public schools in any district by 1990–
1991. The new idea of public school choice, through successive legislative sessions,
eventually survived the innovation process and was accepted into Minnesota public
practice.
Team Entrepreneurship
Team entrepreneurship was evident in this case when all six public entrepreneurs
moved the new idea of public school choice through each phase of the policy
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innovation process. Their creative, intellectual activities marked the initiation
phase when the new idea was borrowed and adapted from other policy domains.
They had argued that choice in education would create a market for educational
services just as choice had created a market for transportation and telecommu-
nication services. By freeing students from a school district’s monopoly control,
students would be allowed to take their state educational dollars to whatever district
they believed would meet their needs. Districts, hoping to retain students, would
have an incentive to improve or face declining enrollments. Thus, competition was
expected to be the means to eliminate the performance gaps in education without
the need to spend more money, and at the same time, improve services as it had in
other deregulated industries.
Interested in spreading their new idea as widely as possible, public entrepreneurs
used many different vehicles to disseminate their ideas. They wrote books, position
papers, journal and newspaper articles, and even helped draft speeches for politi-
cians. They appeared as guests on local and national radio television programs,
and in one case, served as host of a local television public affairs program. The
public entrepreneurs also formed a 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation called Pub-
lic School Incentive (PSI) that operated as a test bed for high-profile ideas and
demonstration projects. To fund such ventures, PSI became the fiscal agent for
foundations willing to give money to support innovative projects in education,
attracting over a million dollars in contributions. The public entrepreneurs also
cultivated bureaucratic insiders who would be needed during the important design
phase when their ideas would be vulnerable to the vagaries of the legislative pro-
cess. They also were instrumental in getting a change-oriented commissioner of
education appointed, and developed key contacts and policy advocates within the
department who later were successful in protecting the fledgling idea through the
tumultuous legislative process and the labor-intensive steps of implementation and
evaluation. They also collaborated on major studies on Minnesota public education
with high-profile groups such as the Citizens League and the Minnesota Business
Partnership, both of which issued reports endorsing their new ideas and public
school choice. And finally, during the new idea’s incubation period, they were
successful in attracting the attention of the governor who became the idea’s major
policy champion when he introduced public school choice to the legislature in
1985.
As the new idea moved from the more quiet deliberations of the initiation
phase to the divisive politics of the design phase, the public entrepreneurs shaped
their grand strategy and vision of the future by using tactical strategies and action
heuristics to meet the evolving political realities. They worked with the governor
and his staff in a number of ways: to enlist other policy champions in the legislature;
to attract additional support from groups such as the PTA and the League of Women
Voters; to cultivate “thought leaders” or “big name types,” such as the CEO of 3M,
in order to add credibility to the new idea; and to build a grassroots group—
People for Better Schools—to shore up the legislative campaign. Their lobby
efforts were developed in almost textbook fashion as they drew in a wide range
of supporters, even traditional educators, to give legitimacy to the idea of public
school choice. Working diligently to get and keep press coverage of the new idea,
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the public entrepreneurs eventually were successful in attracting public awareness
and winning its support.
After the new idea became law, the challenges of the implementation process
began. As outsiders to education, and without formal positions in government, the
public entrepreneurs had no formal authority to oversee or intervene into the imple-
mentation process. The new law was now on educator’s turf in the school districts.
Fortunately their close ties with the commissioner of education and the bureau-
cratic insiders, cultivated over the years, opened up some opportunities. When the
department of education needed help in informing the schools and the public about
the new open enrollment program, the public entrepreneurs were there to help with
the mass mailings. When implementation was not going as smoothly as hoped,
the public entrepreneurs organized student participants in the open enrollment
program to testify before the legislature. By all accounts, their testimony and lob-
bying efforts were responsible for reversing some lawmakers’ opinions on school
choice and preventing the law from being gutted or repealed. When lawmakers ne-
glected to provide funding for evaluation, the public entrepreneurs called contacts
at the U.S. Department of Education for low-cost evaluation assistance. Several
entrepreneurs were even appointed by the commissioner to participate in the first
evaluation task force, and from this vantage point, were able to design, oversee,
and evaluate the statewide implementation of open enrollment. Thus, even through
the difficult phase of the implementation process, we documented the collective
efforts of the six public entrepreneurs.
Functional Entrepreneurship
Functional entrepreneurship was also evident in this case. Policy intellectuals
joined with the public entrepreneurs during the initiation phase to develop ideas
and frame educational problems in such a way that public choice became a much
more viable policy alternative to educators’ solution of pumping more money into
the existing educational system. Policy advocates were instrumental in linking
the intellectuals and policy champions such as Governor Perpich and key legis-
lators, who defended the idea during the political debates and carried the public
school choice idea through to legislative enactment. Policy administrators, such
as Commissioner Randall and other bureaucratic insiders, testified on behalf of
the idea during the legislative hearings, even convening educators to discuss how
to implement public school choice before the idea was introduced into the leg-
islature. Beyond that, administrators played key roles in ensuring that the idea
got fair treatment through the critical implementation and evaluation phases when
opponents launched efforts to undermine it. Close contact among the functional
experts and the public entrepreneurs eventually built a wide base of support and
afforded protection for the new idea as it moved through time.
DISCUSSION
Collective entrepreneurship, whether in the form of team entrepreneurship or func-
tional entrepreneurship, has a number of advantages over the sole entrepreneur
working independently. A single individual, no matter how talented, has a difficult
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time matching the multiple capabilities of a group of people who pool their skills,
talents, and resources in pursuit of a common vision. As one public entrepreneur
noted, “no one person has all the requisite skills or resources needed to engage in
such a large-scale policy change and we need each other to distribute the workload.”
Team entrepreneurship enables the group to draw on the specialized skills of each
member. As another commented: “some people can do certain things that other
people can’t do. . . . I mean, some people can write. Some people can talk to politi-
cians better than other people can . . . or some people have status that other people
haven’t got.” Thus, some entrepreneurs wrote proposals, others concentrated on
developing strategies for change, and still others focused their energies on the leg-
islative process, building interest group support and lobbying the legislature. One
of the reasons they believed that their new idea managed to survive the trials of
the innovation process was that “there were enough of us doing it. . . . There was
nearly always somebody pushing it. . . . You know there was always somebody
turning some dial or turning some lever or talking to somebody. And if you didn’t
like what we were doing, it probably seemed like we were busier than we were.”
Also, because most of the public entrepreneurs had full-time jobs outside of
their policy interests in education, one additional advantage was that they could
serve as back-up to one another should their regular work schedules conflict with
their entrepreneurship. However, it was well understood that if a member faced
job-related time constraints, he still was expected to do something to aid the overall
innovation effort. It was acceptable, for example, to attend meetings, offer one’s
views, but leave the day-to-day follow-up to those with more time to devote to
entrepreneurial activities.
Team entrepreneurship also offered the advantage of an extended resource base.
Each team member drew on a unique set of organizational contacts, and taken to-
gether, they offered an impressive constellation of organizational support, far more
extensive than what a single individual was likely to have amassed in the same
amount of time. As one noted, they had “enough knowledge to connect with any-
thing worth getting at elsewhere in the country . . . contacts with people and famil-
iarity with projects under way.” This organizational multiplier effect had several
benefits. Rather than attending functions and activities as a team of like-minded
change agents, they justifiably could claim to represent many different groups in
the community. That tactic worked especially well when they were asked to send
representatives to various policymaking sessions in the legislature or in the commu-
nity. Rather than one small group of people doing battle with entrenched interests,
they came as separate individuals representing different, well-known organizations
that increased their visibility and added more credibility to their ideas.
Their extensive network of contacts also made it easier to attract resources
for research and demonstration projects. Money from the Northwest Foundation
funded a project to test the concepts of school-cite management and teachers in
private practice. And the money from the McKnight Foundation permitted one en-
trepreneur to revise a book on educational reform. Their close association with the
Citizens League opened up opportunities to participate in study teams, one of which
advocated of public school choice as a way to break the monopoly of the traditional
school bureaucracy. Their contacts with the Minnesota Business Partnership
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enabled them to influence a major study of education that recommended public
school choice to foster innovation and change in the schools without raising taxes
and passing a host of new legislation. Most team members also could count on in-
direct support from their employers in the form of secretarial services, mail, phone,
and copying privileges, and occasionally, money for research assistance. Although
employers did not allocate specific budgets for innovative activities, they did allow
significant flexibility in their employees’ work schedules so the entrepreneurs had
some time to pursue their goals of educational reform. Thus, there existed a very
rich base of community resources on which the public entrepreneurs could draw.
Without its existence and munificence, it would have been difficult to build let
alone maintain the momentum for the idea given its formidable opposition.
There is one more important advantage that collective entrepreneurship has over
individual entrepreneurship. We know that innovative ideas can be incremental or
radical in nature, meaning that they can vary incrementally or they can radically
differ from current practice (Roberts and King, 1996). It is likely that the more
radical the idea, the greater resistance there will be to it. The reasoning is straight-
forward. By definition, people lack familiarity with a radical idea and how it might
work in practice. The more alien or different it appears to them, the more likely
they are to be skeptical about it or reject it outright. The more objections they
mount to the idea, the harder entrepreneurs have to work to counter and overcome
the resistance. Entrepreneurs who want to keep pushing their new idea forward
are forced to expand their base of operations: build a larger coalition of support,
seek additional resources, and develop new strategies and tactics. Resistance forces
them to respond with an expanded set of activities and countermeasures. Because
it is less likely that a single entrepreneur could shoulder this burden alone, we
expect to find entrepreneurs who support radical ideas joining forces to work with
others either as a team of public entrepreneurs or a collective of functional experts.
This certainly was the case in Minnesota. The public entrepreneurs established
a nonprofit corporation to provide a test bed for demonstration projects, went to
great lengths to disseminate ideas, lobbied the legislature, and worked with the
media. They conducted these activities as a team and in concert with the policy
champions, administrators, and evaluators who also supported the idea of school
choice. The time and resource demands would have made it very difficult, if not
impossible, for one of them to undertake these activities by himself. There was an
advantage in working together.
On the other hand, collective entrepreneurship can have its disadvantages. Time
and effort is required to build a team and develop an identity, structure, and norms
for day-to-day operations. Leadership and coordination of member activities must
never be taken for granted. Someone has to call meetings, prepare agendas, keep
people up-to-date on the latest developments, prepare whatever written documen-
tation is required, develop plans, and craft strategies to meet the changing polit-
ical climate, and coordinate with those who share similar policy objectives. And
teams have to prepare for conflicts, especially those committed to policy changes
that likely attract people holding different ideological and political views. In the
case of the Minnesota public entrepreneurs, there were conflicts over legislative
priorities because each entrepreneur had a different constituency and each came
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with his own personal preference. Some were associated with the Minnesota Busi-
ness Partnership and advocated greater accountability through statewide tests and
measurement of student performance. Others favored policies that promoted ac-
cess and equity for children at risk due to the social problems of poverty, unem-
ployment, and dysfunctional families. Conflicts also surfaced about the nature of
change—how fast to change and whether to compromise or hold out for one’s
policy objectives. Unless an entrepreneurial team can work through its differences
and establish a consensus on priorities, it risks losing the advantages that col-
lective entrepreneurship affords them. Entrepreneurial teams unable to surmount
their ideological, political, and personal differences ultimately will divert attention
from the innovative idea and create opportunities for the opposition to exploit. In
the case of the Minnesota public entrepreneurs, they believed they were successful
because they avoided direct confrontations and showdowns, and worked instead
to accommodate their individual differences. They were able to suspend “major
egos to work together” and were able to agree that there were some things that
could be done differently to accommodate individual preferences. When all else
failed, they “agreed to disagree.”
CONCLUSION
In our age of skepticism and distrust of government, the image of the lone en-
trepreneur fighting single-handedly against all odds to transform public policy and
reinvent public management has romantic appeal. We want to believe that a cre-
ative, inventive individual can make a difference. Belief in this heroic model of
entrepreneurship, however, is becoming more difficult to sustain in our complex,
interdependent world. The likelihood that any one person has the skills, resources,
time, and stamina to launch an entrepreneurial venture on his own begs credulity,
especially when the idea is a radical one that provokes an enormous amount of
resistance from the public, politicians, and the policy community. Rarely do we
find public entrepreneurs capable of “going it alone,” if they ever did. The world
of public sector innovation, especially in a complex intergovernmental system,
calls for sharing ideas and power with others to get anything done (Bryson and
Einsweiler, 1991; Roberts, 1991). We find a compelling logic in collective rather
than individual public entrepreneurship.
This article has introduced two forms of collective entrepreneurship. Team
entrepreneurship pools the talents of multiple entrepreneurs who find advantage
in working together through all phases of the innovation process. Functional en-
trepreneurship links specialists, who, working from their vantage point of expertise,
hand off a new idea from one specialist to another to keep the new idea flowing and
developing over time. The policy intellectual invents, adapts, or borrows the idea
from other contexts and offers it as a new solution to problems in a policy domain.
The policy champion joins the effort and uses her resources, credibility, and power
to back the new idea and press for its acceptance in law, statute, or policy before
a legislature or oversight group. The policy implementer takes up the cause and
confronts the resistance, or at least inertia, when the new idea, in law, statute, or
policy, is implemented in practice and old operating procedures are replaced with
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new administrative routines. As is predicted for team entrepreneurship, the greater
the coordination among all functional experts, the greater the likelihood the new
idea will survive to be a full-blown policy innovation.
The case study of public school choice in Minnesota illustrates both forms of
collective entrepreneurship in practice. Each appears to be a viable route to innova-
tion. Each also demonstrates how important the larger interorganizational domain
is for creativity and the incubation of new ideas. Even collective entrepreneur-
ship, despite its advantages over individual entrepreneurship, does not exist in a
vacuum. The Minnesota case illustrates how important the linkages are between
the public entrepreneurs and the larger community. Without the network of com-
munity resources, it would have been very difficult to sustain momentum for the
idea of public school choice. The idea’s survival and development depended on
the infrastructure that surrounded it. An “ecology of organizations” provided the
critical “venture capital” for issue analysis and experimentation. Organizations
such as the Citizens League of Minneapolis and the Minnesota Business Part-
nership were “catalysts” and “incubators” for innovative agendas (Roberts and
King, 1996). The public entrepreneurs as a team and as a constellation of func-
tional experts benefited greatly from working in an environment that was resource
munificent.
Yet there was more to their social creativity than economic capital. The public
entrepreneurs were successful to a large extent because they were able to manage
their internal team dynamics. Even though they were a collection of people from
different ideological perspectives, they did not allow their differences to distract
them from their common vision. The deft management of their internal relation-
ships not only facilitated their working together, but it attracted an even wider base
of supporters who normally would not have joined forces. The extensive relational
network of contacts and associations, which the public entrepreneurs eventually
pulled together from throughout the state and the nation, created a very important
form of social capital just as important as the community’s economic capital. Both
forms of capital were instrumental in bringing about the radical policy change of
public school choice. Thus, from the Minnesota public entrepreneurs, we learn
how important the social aspects of creativity are, both in terms of community re-
source support, and in terms of the social dynamics and relationships that underpin
all forms of collective entrepreneurship.
NOTES
1. Innovation phases do not imply a sequential logic in the idea’s trajectory. We know for example
that the more novel an innovative idea, the more overlap there tends to be among the phases. What
this means in practice is that when people work on highly original, innovative ideas, they may be
engaged in both initiation and design or design and implementation at the same time.
2. The phases of the innovation process describe innovation in global terms, stating the necessary
conditions for innovation to occur. If a new idea is not created, designed, and implemented, it
will not be able to attain the developed status we attribute to an innovation. In contrast, public
entrepreneurs can go through a much messier process that follows no predetermined set of activities.
As Kingdon reminds us, “events do not proceed neatly in stages, steps, or phases . . . Participants
do not first identify problems and then seek solutions for them; indeed, advocacy of solutions
often precedes the highlighting of problems to which they become attached” (Kingdon, 1984,
p. 215). In fact, some would advocate this messiness, by encouraging public entrepreneurs to work
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implementation issues while they are creating and designing new policy (Pressman and Wildavsky,
1973).
3. These two forms of collective entrepreneurship (team and functional) are sometimes difficult to
distinguish in the field. Longitudinal studies are necessary to separate functional experts who are
activated at certain stages of the innovation process and entrepreneurial teams who work collabo-
ratively through all stages of the policy innovation process.
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